THE FUCK CHINA POLICY: A FILIPINO’S RESPONSE TO THE BATANES CLAIM

[An MCT Opinion]

I saw the headline this week and laughed. Then I got angry.

Chinese academics sat in a room in Guangzhou last June 30 and said Batanes belongs to China through Taiwan. They argued that our northernmost province is just an extension of Taiwan, and since China claims Taiwan, it can claim Batanes too.

Batanes. Home of the Ivatans. A province that votes in Philippine elections, pays Philippine taxes, and lives under Philippine law. And yet, on a Chinese campus, it turns into somebody else’s territory.

Defense Secretary Gibo Teodoro called the claim a joke. AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines) spokesperson Rear Admiral Roy Vincent Trinidad asked, “What’s next, Jupiter?”

That is basically how a lot of us feel.

WHAT THEY ARE CLAIMING

The Chinese scholars built their argument on three points.

One, they said the Batan Islands are a natural geographical extension of Taiwan, so if China controls Taiwan, it controls Batanes.

Two, they pointed to cultural similarities between the Ivatan people and Taiwan’s Tao community, like shared language roots and traditional boats, and used that as proof that Batanes used to be under Taiwan’s jurisdiction.

Three, they used their reading of the 1898 Treaty of Paris and the 1946 Treaty of Manila to argue that Batanes sits outside the lines that define Philippine territory.

On that last part, our own records already corrected the treaty language.

A committee report to the Philippine Senate clarified that the original description of the northern boundary had an error and that the actual line runs along the Bashi Channel at 21°25' north latitude.

Batanes is inside that line. It is not floating on the wrong side of the map.

On culture, the link between Ivatan and Tao communities is real. People crossed those waters long before anyone drew borders. But shared ancestry does not hand over a province. If it did, half of Latin America would still be under Madrid.

WHY THIS IS NOT JUST ACADEMIC TALK

SeaLight, a group that tracks ships and maritime activity, warned that this is part of lawfare, using law and research to slowly build a story that supports future moves.

After that symposium, Chinese media started talking about protecting China’s “sovereignty” in Batanes and about their coast guard needing to patrol those waters.

We have seen this style before. In the West Philippine Sea, it started with arguments about history and maps.

Then Chinese fishing boats stayed longer. Then the coast guard showed up.

Then ships began blocking and ramming Filipino vessels.

Then structures appeared on reefs, even after the 2016 arbitral ruling said China had no legal basis for its nine-dash line.

Batanes already felt some of that presence.

In April 2025, a Chinese research vessel stayed inside our exclusive economic zone near Batanes for several days, sailing in tracks that looked like survey work, without asking permission from Manila.

A year before that, another Chinese ship passed through Itbayat and Basco in Batanes before lingering off Catanduanes.

So when I see scholars talk about “natural extension of Taiwan,” and I know ships have already been moving near Batanes, it is hard to pretend this is just theory.

BATANES IS A REAL PLACE, NOT A CONCEPT

Batanes is not a line on a slide. It is a set of islands that get hit by multiple typhoons every year.

Ivatan families live there, farm there, fish there, and send their kids to schools funded by the Philippine government.

Florencio “Butch” Abad, a Batanes native and former representative of the province, called the Chinese scholars’ claim wishful thinking with no basis in history or law.

He said it looks like a setup to excuse future actions, like ships showing up where they should not.

For the people who actually live there, the argument is personal. It raises a hard possibility: another government turning up one day and insisting their land and sea were never really theirs.

HOW DUTERTE HELPED CHINA PUSH

China is this bold now partly because of what it learned during Rodrigo Duterte’s time in Malacañang.

In 2016, the Philippines won a major victory. The arbitral tribunal in The Hague rejected China’s nine-dash line and said Beijing’s so-called historic rights claims in the South China Sea had no basis under UNCLOS (United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea).

We had a strong ruling. Duterte chose not to push it.

He went to Beijing in October 2016 and announced his separation from the United States, saying he would depend on China instead. He talked about billions in Chinese investments and loans. Many of those pledges never really took form. Reviews of his term later showed that Chinese financing stayed small compared to other countries like Japan, and that several promised railway projects never moved forward.

At sea, his decisions did more damage.

Duterte admitted that he agreed to maintain the status quo at Ayungin Shoal. That meant the Philippines would not bring construction materials to repair the BRP Sierra Madre, the rusty ship we grounded there as our outpost.

His former spokesperson, Harry Roque, later confirmed that Duterte and Xi had a gentleman’s agreement: we could bring food and water, but no materials that would strengthen the ship or build new structures.

Retired Supreme Court Justice Antonio Carpio said Duterte had no authority to give up the country’s right to maintain that outpost and that such a concession would surrender our rights over Ayungin Shoal.

Duterte also talked about a fishing understanding with China, that Filipino and Chinese fishermen could both access certain waters around Scarborough Shoal.

Even when his spokesperson tried to deny there was a formal deal, China later cited that arrangement to justify limiting our military and coast guard activities near those areas.

The result was simple. China saw a Philippine leader willing to joke about the ruling, make quiet side arrangements, and keep confrontations downplayed. They saw a country that would not fully use the legal victory it had just earned.

Duterte is now facing a separate case at the ICC (International Criminal Court) over the drug war. He is no longer in office. But the way he handled China still shapes the map we are living with.

WHY SARA DUTERTE AND 2028 WORRY ME

Now we are looking at 2028, and the timing of this Batanes claim hits a nerve.

Vice President Sara Duterte has already said she will run for president.

She is facing an impeachment trial in the Senate over alleged misuse of hundreds of millions of pesos in confidential funds and for plots against President Marcos and other officials. Even with all that, some analysts still think she can win.

On the West Philippine Sea, her record is very clear.

When Chinese ships were repeatedly blasting Filipino sailors with water cannons at Ayungin Shoal in early 2024, she stayed silent. When reporters finally asked her about it, she replied, “No comment,” and said the Department of Foreign Affairs and the defense secretary should answer.

When she later commented on foreign policy, she questioned Marcos for allowing the deployment of US missiles in the country, saying the Philippines needs to fix relations with all neighbors and avoid antagonizing them.

Malacañang described those remarks as exactly what people would expect from someone pro-China.

Her brother, Davao City Mayor Sebastian “Baste” Duterte, went even further. He called China a loving neighbor that shares its growth and prosperity. He welcomed Chinese Ambassador Jing Quan to Davao City in January 2026, in the middle of tensions between Chinese diplomats and Philippine lawmakers over West Philippine Sea issues.

PCG (Philippine Coast Guard) spokesperson Commodore Jay Tarriela has said openly that the outcome of the 2028 presidential election will matter to China.

He believes Beijing will favor a candidate who will not stand up firmly for Philippine rights. He also noted that under Rodrigo Duterte, only a few West Philippine Sea incidents were ever disclosed to the public. Many confrontations stayed off the radar.

Foreign policy observers worry that a Sara Duterte presidency could take us back toward Beijing and away from closer defense cooperation with the United States and other allies.

In that scenario, it becomes much easier for China to push new stories and new lines, over reefs, shoals, and now provinces like Batanes.

WHAT A FUCK CHINA POLICY LOOKS LIKE IN REAL TERMS

The title is emotional. The policy idea under it has to be practical.

Defending Batanes means keeping AFP troops and coast guard presence in the province strong.

When China complained about increased military presence there, Philippine officials were right to say we do not need Beijing’s permission to secure our own territory.

It also means investing in infrastructure in Batanes, ports, roads, communication facilities, so the province is not treated as a distant edge but as a clearly connected part of the country.

Defending the West Philippine Sea means using the 2016 arbitral ruling consistently, not occasionally. It is the clearest legal document we have on our side.

It also means rejecting and exposing secret deals that limit our ability to repair or supply our own outposts.

Agreements like the gentleman’s arrangement over BRP Sierra Madre should not be treated like harmless diplomacy. They gave China room to push.

Defending the story means answering Chinese lawfare with clear explanations that ordinary Filipinos can actually read.

When scholars claim Batanes, our own lawyers, historians, and researchers should answer with short, readable pieces that explain the record and expose the lie.

It also means calling out local politicians who keep sounding like Beijing’s backup singers. Their words have real effect on how firmly this country can push back.

Defending the future vote means understanding that this issue does not stop at ships and treaties. It reaches the ballot box.

An OCTA Research survey in 2026 showed that most Filipinos are willing to support defending our territory and sovereign rights in the West Philippine Sea. This is not just a Manila issue. Filipinos already know what is at stake.

The danger is not that people do not care. The danger is that we put people in power who say “no comment” when our sailors are attacked, who call China a loving neighbor while its coast guard harasses our boats, and who treat legal victories like something to set aside quietly.

A CALL TO ALL NATION-LOVING FILIPINOS

If you care about keeping Batanes, the West Philippine Sea, and the rest of our territory ours, then pay attention.

Watch every China-related headline closely, especially anything about agreements, understandings, or joint development. That is usually where quiet concessions hide.

Support leaders who clearly defend the arbitral ruling, reject secret arrangements with Beijing, and speak plainly against Chinese harassment at sea.

Push back against politicians who stay silent when our sailors are attacked or who keep praising China while our own fishermen are being pushed aside.

Talk about Batanes, Ayungin, Scarborough, and the West Philippine Sea with your family, your friends, and the people you work with. When these places become part of our normal conversations, it gets harder for anyone to quietly trade them away.

The sea and the islands will not defend themselves. If we want a real Fuck China Policy, it starts with us refusing to vote for, applaud, or stay quiet for anyone who treats our sovereignty as something they can bargain away.

For me, the anger over Batanes is tied to one worry. Chinese scholars are testing stories now. Chinese ships have already sniffed around the province. The next line they cross will depend a lot on who is sitting in Malacañang in 2028.

That is the part I am most afraid of.